Yea i didn't write about it but I can explain it. Very good question. As said before, Europe is more regionalized than North America which is more regionalized than Africa.
In europe, when you think of making an Airbus, most of the parts that go into making that plane are employing people in Europe.
In north america, due to the first China shock, America imports a lot of intermediate goods from China, if more trade was between America-Mexico, even more intermediate goods jobs would in the Texas-Arizona to Mexico border than more.
Places like Sub Saharan Africa or Latin America trade more outside than their region than in. A place like Bolivia or Congo just sells copper but is not getting into the piece of the action of making an EV since they just sell the raw copper. They aren't getting the jobs for the other use cases than copper firms or any firm that uses copper could be employing then for.
Many people believe that globalization has created a "flat" world where goods are traded freely and widely across all regions. You'll see that by NYT writere like Thomas Friedman or CNN people like Fareed Zakaria.
The Reality:
In practice, most trade is concentrated within three major regional hubs:
North America, Europe and East Asia & the Pacific
Other regions—such as Latin America, Russia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—are far less integrated into global supply chains.
Why This Matters:
Most trade consists of intermediate goods, meaning production happens within regional supply chains rather than truly global networks.
Global trade in commodities (oil, metals, agriculture) is an exception, but this occurs at the tail end of supply chains rather than driving globalization itself.
The::
The real world isn’t a single, unified trading system but rather three dominant trade blocs that do most of their trade within their own regions (with North America less compared to East Asia & EU) rather than across the entire globe.
Totally agree that "for America to compete there must be stronger regionalization with neighbors."
A nation of 340m (US) simply cannot compete head to head with a nation of 1.4b (China). The US' best strategy is to work together with allies in the Americas, Asia, and Europe against China, but the free trade agreements to enable this have become politically untouchable. Now, instead of working with allies, Trump is antagonizing them.
China has now adopted America's strategy of free trade agreements with RCEP to strengthen its economy and competitiveness and build alliances.
1. Cherry-picked examples: The article relies heavily on specific case studies (Akron, Columbus, Hartford) that may not be representative of broader economic patterns. This selective focus could create a misleading narrative about regionalisation's benefits.
2. Simplistic causation: The article attributes regional economic success primarily to trade agreements like NAFTA, but doesn't adequately address other factors like technological change, industry-specific dynamics, or domestic policy choices that may have played equally important roles.
3. Weak statistical evidence: The article mentions that "only 2% of economic growth from 1990 to 2023 can be explained by increased trade openness," yet still advocates strongly for regionalisation. This contradiction isn't fully reconciled.
Conceptual Problems
1. False dichotomy: The article positions regionalisation and globalisation as opposing concepts, when they might better be understood as complementary or overlapping phenomena. This framing oversimplifies complex economic relationships.
2. Definitional ambiguity: The article doesn't clearly define what constitutes "regionalisation" versus "globalisation," making it difficult to evaluate claims about which countries fall into which categories.
3. Time period selectivity: The analysis mostly focuses on recent decades but makes sweeping claims about globalisation's historical impact. This narrow timeframe might not capture long-term economic trends.
Political and Economic Blindspots
1. Labour perspective omission: While the article mentions job losses in places like the Midwest, it doesn't deeply engage with the experiences of workers or examine whether regionalisation would meaningfully address their concerns compared to globalisation.
2. Power dynamics: The article doesn't adequately address how economic regionalisation might reinforce existing power imbalances between countries within regions, potentially creating regional hegemonies.
3. Environmental considerations: The article doesn't consider the environmental implications of regionalisation versus globalisation, which could be significant in terms of transportation emissions and resource use.
4. Geopolitical simplification: The article presents regionalisation as primarily an economic phenomenon while underplaying its significant geopolitical dimensions and security implications.
Presentational Issues
1. Ideological framing: The article presents O'Neil's background at the Council on Foreign Relations as "the 'brains' of the 'American Military Industrial Complex,'" which suggests a potential bias in how the author interprets O'Neil's arguments.
2. Uneven analysis: The article explores European and East Asian regionalisation in depth but provides less detailed analysis of North American regionalisation, despite this being central to the policy recommendations.
3. Contradictory statements: At points, the article seems to both praise and criticise globalisation without clarifying when each perspective applies, creating confusion about the overall argument.
These critiques don't necessarily invalidate the article's insights, but they highlight areas where additional nuance, evidence, or perspective could strengthen the analysis of regionalisation versus globalisation.
You are right I didn't address those things. I try to make my articles at a 15 minute read max but I could have spoken about the geopolitics, experiences of workers, and how free trade agreements explicitly try to improve environmental standards.
Part 4 response:
For the contradictory point, I am surprised you found it contradictory since my editors did not. However, I did get feedback that I could be clearer in distinguishing what the author thinks about globalization and what I think about it. For example, it appears it did not come clear that I was providing insights that globalization is not a clear panacea. The whole point was to point out that globalization is a double edged sword. I was not trying to present globalization as inherently good or bad, but frame it as a process where some people win and some people lose with the unequal distribution of gains and losses.
I could have made these distinctions clearer which would have prevented readers from feeling like I was "shifting positions"/
I didn’t present a rigid either-or choice but a spectrum:
1)No trade at all
2)Trading globally but primarily within a region
3)Trading globally but mostly outside one’s region
Your definitional ambiguity point:
I explicitly defined regionalization as primarily trading within a region—illustrated by the interregional trade graph.
I even stated: "Europe and East Asia trade mostly within their blocs, while the U.S. is less regionally concentrated. Everywhere else trades significantly more outside their bloc than within."
Your time selectivity point:
The article focuses on post-1990 trade trends because that period marks the era of hyperglobalization.
What sweeping claims about globalization’s history did I make? My analysis is centered on recent decades post 1990, not broad historical generalizations.
Hey Critical Perspectives thanks for the comments here's my response:
1. The case studies (Akron, Columbus, Hartford) illustrate broader economic patterns, not isolated anomalies. The U.S. has many examples of industries that thrived due to regional integration and its expressed in the aggregate stats like gdp growth and low unemployment. But, like I said, free trade has broad based benefits (cheap goods and high paying jobs for professionals) with concentrated losses in the Rust Belt.
2. To the simplistic causation point. The argument isn't that NAFTA alone saved firms like Cummins, but that regional integration with NAFTA provided a competitive alternative to outright decline when faced with global competition.
3. The 2% point is my critique of her point of more trade openness being a slam dunk for more growth. Secondly, my regression wasn't about regionalization but countries that increased trade openness in general. As mentioned before, Africa, Latin America, Middle East trade more outside than inside. While East Asia and Europe trade more inside their region than outside. So when I point out that Congo has increased openness but had gdp decline, that isn't a knock on regionalization because most of Congo's trade is outside the Africa region.
Thank you so much for the detailed response and clarifications, I appreciate it. I think the most significant remaining gap is around how regionalisation specifically addresses worker concerns better than other approaches, this would strengthen the policy relevance of the article's conclusions. All the same, thank you v much for the read, I really enjoyed it.
Many people believe that globalization has created a "flat" world where goods are traded freely and widely across all regions. You'll see that by NYT writers like Thomas Friedman or CNN people like Fareed Zakaria.
The Reality:
In practice, most trade is concentrated within three major regional hubs:
North America, Europe, and East Asia & the Pacific is responsible for 85% of global trade.
Other regions—such as Latin America, Russia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—are far less integrated into global supply chains. They make up 15%.
Why This Matters:
Most trade consists of intermediate goods, meaning production happens within regional supply chains rather than truly global networks.
Commodity trade is global (oil, metals, agriculture)but this occurs at the very beginning of supply chain and isn't involved in all the frequent cross border trade of intermediate and finished parts.
The real world isn’t a single, unified trading system but rather three dominant trade blocs that do most of their trade within their own regions (with North America trading less regionally compared to East Asia & EU) rather than across the entire globe.
Europe trades ~70% with itself, East Asia 50%, north america: 40%. The rest of the regions trade like 5 to 25% within their region.
Take a look at latest 2025 DHL trade statistics, intra-regional trade is at an all time low within pas 20 years. Take a look also at latest McKinsey report on trade connectedness. Regional blocks and trade agreements have been around for ages well before globalization (which is better eefined in terms of connectedness than how the books defines it), but more thorough data from looking at trade connectedness and value flow doesn’t support the myth. The myth itself is a myth🤣
Yea i didn't write about it but I can explain it. Very good question. As said before, Europe is more regionalized than North America which is more regionalized than Africa.
In europe, when you think of making an Airbus, most of the parts that go into making that plane are employing people in Europe.
In north america, due to the first China shock, America imports a lot of intermediate goods from China, if more trade was between America-Mexico, even more intermediate goods jobs would in the Texas-Arizona to Mexico border than more.
Places like Sub Saharan Africa or Latin America trade more outside than their region than in. A place like Bolivia or Congo just sells copper but is not getting into the piece of the action of making an EV since they just sell the raw copper. They aren't getting the jobs for the other use cases than copper firms or any firm that uses copper could be employing then for.
The Myth:
Many people believe that globalization has created a "flat" world where goods are traded freely and widely across all regions. You'll see that by NYT writere like Thomas Friedman or CNN people like Fareed Zakaria.
The Reality:
In practice, most trade is concentrated within three major regional hubs:
North America, Europe and East Asia & the Pacific
Other regions—such as Latin America, Russia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—are far less integrated into global supply chains.
Why This Matters:
Most trade consists of intermediate goods, meaning production happens within regional supply chains rather than truly global networks.
Global trade in commodities (oil, metals, agriculture) is an exception, but this occurs at the tail end of supply chains rather than driving globalization itself.
The::
The real world isn’t a single, unified trading system but rather three dominant trade blocs that do most of their trade within their own regions (with North America less compared to East Asia & EU) rather than across the entire globe.
Totally agree that "for America to compete there must be stronger regionalization with neighbors."
A nation of 340m (US) simply cannot compete head to head with a nation of 1.4b (China). The US' best strategy is to work together with allies in the Americas, Asia, and Europe against China, but the free trade agreements to enable this have become politically untouchable. Now, instead of working with allies, Trump is antagonizing them.
China has now adopted America's strategy of free trade agreements with RCEP to strengthen its economy and competitiveness and build alliances.
Some points to note:
Methodological and Data Issues
1. Cherry-picked examples: The article relies heavily on specific case studies (Akron, Columbus, Hartford) that may not be representative of broader economic patterns. This selective focus could create a misleading narrative about regionalisation's benefits.
2. Simplistic causation: The article attributes regional economic success primarily to trade agreements like NAFTA, but doesn't adequately address other factors like technological change, industry-specific dynamics, or domestic policy choices that may have played equally important roles.
3. Weak statistical evidence: The article mentions that "only 2% of economic growth from 1990 to 2023 can be explained by increased trade openness," yet still advocates strongly for regionalisation. This contradiction isn't fully reconciled.
Conceptual Problems
1. False dichotomy: The article positions regionalisation and globalisation as opposing concepts, when they might better be understood as complementary or overlapping phenomena. This framing oversimplifies complex economic relationships.
2. Definitional ambiguity: The article doesn't clearly define what constitutes "regionalisation" versus "globalisation," making it difficult to evaluate claims about which countries fall into which categories.
3. Time period selectivity: The analysis mostly focuses on recent decades but makes sweeping claims about globalisation's historical impact. This narrow timeframe might not capture long-term economic trends.
Political and Economic Blindspots
1. Labour perspective omission: While the article mentions job losses in places like the Midwest, it doesn't deeply engage with the experiences of workers or examine whether regionalisation would meaningfully address their concerns compared to globalisation.
2. Power dynamics: The article doesn't adequately address how economic regionalisation might reinforce existing power imbalances between countries within regions, potentially creating regional hegemonies.
3. Environmental considerations: The article doesn't consider the environmental implications of regionalisation versus globalisation, which could be significant in terms of transportation emissions and resource use.
4. Geopolitical simplification: The article presents regionalisation as primarily an economic phenomenon while underplaying its significant geopolitical dimensions and security implications.
Presentational Issues
1. Ideological framing: The article presents O'Neil's background at the Council on Foreign Relations as "the 'brains' of the 'American Military Industrial Complex,'" which suggests a potential bias in how the author interprets O'Neil's arguments.
2. Uneven analysis: The article explores European and East Asian regionalisation in depth but provides less detailed analysis of North American regionalisation, despite this being central to the policy recommendations.
3. Contradictory statements: At points, the article seems to both praise and criticise globalisation without clarifying when each perspective applies, creating confusion about the overall argument.
These critiques don't necessarily invalidate the article's insights, but they highlight areas where additional nuance, evidence, or perspective could strengthen the analysis of regionalisation versus globalisation.
Thank you again for your comments!
Part 3 responses:
You are right I didn't address those things. I try to make my articles at a 15 minute read max but I could have spoken about the geopolitics, experiences of workers, and how free trade agreements explicitly try to improve environmental standards.
Part 4 response:
For the contradictory point, I am surprised you found it contradictory since my editors did not. However, I did get feedback that I could be clearer in distinguishing what the author thinks about globalization and what I think about it. For example, it appears it did not come clear that I was providing insights that globalization is not a clear panacea. The whole point was to point out that globalization is a double edged sword. I was not trying to present globalization as inherently good or bad, but frame it as a process where some people win and some people lose with the unequal distribution of gains and losses.
I could have made these distinctions clearer which would have prevented readers from feeling like I was "shifting positions"/
Part 2: Addressing Conceptual Problems
Your False Dichotomy point
I didn’t present a rigid either-or choice but a spectrum:
1)No trade at all
2)Trading globally but primarily within a region
3)Trading globally but mostly outside one’s region
Your definitional ambiguity point:
I explicitly defined regionalization as primarily trading within a region—illustrated by the interregional trade graph.
I even stated: "Europe and East Asia trade mostly within their blocs, while the U.S. is less regionally concentrated. Everywhere else trades significantly more outside their bloc than within."
Your time selectivity point:
The article focuses on post-1990 trade trends because that period marks the era of hyperglobalization.
What sweeping claims about globalization’s history did I make? My analysis is centered on recent decades post 1990, not broad historical generalizations.
Hey Critical Perspectives thanks for the comments here's my response:
1. The case studies (Akron, Columbus, Hartford) illustrate broader economic patterns, not isolated anomalies. The U.S. has many examples of industries that thrived due to regional integration and its expressed in the aggregate stats like gdp growth and low unemployment. But, like I said, free trade has broad based benefits (cheap goods and high paying jobs for professionals) with concentrated losses in the Rust Belt.
2. To the simplistic causation point. The argument isn't that NAFTA alone saved firms like Cummins, but that regional integration with NAFTA provided a competitive alternative to outright decline when faced with global competition.
3. The 2% point is my critique of her point of more trade openness being a slam dunk for more growth. Secondly, my regression wasn't about regionalization but countries that increased trade openness in general. As mentioned before, Africa, Latin America, Middle East trade more outside than inside. While East Asia and Europe trade more inside their region than outside. So when I point out that Congo has increased openness but had gdp decline, that isn't a knock on regionalization because most of Congo's trade is outside the Africa region.
Thank you so much for the detailed response and clarifications, I appreciate it. I think the most significant remaining gap is around how regionalisation specifically addresses worker concerns better than other approaches, this would strengthen the policy relevance of the article's conclusions. All the same, thank you v much for the read, I really enjoyed it.
The question is what exactly is the myth? Is she referring to popular belief and what really happens or ?
The Myth:
Many people believe that globalization has created a "flat" world where goods are traded freely and widely across all regions. You'll see that by NYT writers like Thomas Friedman or CNN people like Fareed Zakaria.
The Reality:
In practice, most trade is concentrated within three major regional hubs:
North America, Europe, and East Asia & the Pacific is responsible for 85% of global trade.
Other regions—such as Latin America, Russia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—are far less integrated into global supply chains. They make up 15%.
Why This Matters:
Most trade consists of intermediate goods, meaning production happens within regional supply chains rather than truly global networks.
Commodity trade is global (oil, metals, agriculture)but this occurs at the very beginning of supply chain and isn't involved in all the frequent cross border trade of intermediate and finished parts.
The real world isn’t a single, unified trading system but rather three dominant trade blocs that do most of their trade within their own regions (with North America trading less regionally compared to East Asia & EU) rather than across the entire globe.
Europe trades ~70% with itself, East Asia 50%, north america: 40%. The rest of the regions trade like 5 to 25% within their region.
Take a look at latest 2025 DHL trade statistics, intra-regional trade is at an all time low within pas 20 years. Take a look also at latest McKinsey report on trade connectedness. Regional blocks and trade agreements have been around for ages well before globalization (which is better eefined in terms of connectedness than how the books defines it), but more thorough data from looking at trade connectedness and value flow doesn’t support the myth. The myth itself is a myth🤣