The Economic & Geopolitical History of Niger (Part II): Resource Nationalism & The Tuareg Rebellions
Today, you will learn about failed Resource Nationalism & Darker people oppressing Lighter people
Last time on Niger, we discussed the pre-colonial histories of the distinct people (Tuareg, Hausa, Fulani, Songhay) who live in this fabricated country. Then we discussed how the French colonized Niger, oppressed the Tuareg, and favorited the Songhai tribe since they were the most amendable to French values.
Most of Niger’s colonial history was forcing locals to sell peanuts and cattle or else their huts, tents, or adobe houses would be burnt to the ground. It wasn’t until the late 1950s where serious uranium mining excavation started.
Fast forward to the late 1950s, and Niger had two main parties: the Songhai-led Nigerien Progressive Party (think "French puppet regime") and the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, Sawaba Movement (think "communist rebels"). The pro-French party won, and Hamani Diori took the reins at independence. But, things got messy quickly - the Sawaba Movement tried to assassinate Diori, and he responded by banning the party, exiling opponents, and stacking his cabinet with French civil servants and Songhai loyalists (alienating 70% of the population, genius move!). Let's just say Diori's regime was wildly unpopular from the start. Now, onto the independence history.
Hamani Diori (1960-1974)
Diori's reign is like a terrible orchestra. He hit all the wrong notes of governance, creating a symphony of chaos and discontent.
Unstable Autocracy: At independence, Hamani swiftly moved to suppress the Sawaba movement, viewing them as subversive. He banned their leader, Bakari, from the nation, and intensified efforts to thwart coup attempts through extensive surveillance. Following the trend of other African leaders, he established a one-party state, stifling opposition parties.
French-Afrique: Hamani, like other French colonies (except Guinea), accepted French financial aid, French military support under the 1961 Defense Act, French businesses, and French civil servants post-independence. In return, France received preferential access to Niger’s uranium and other strategic minerals, with low royalty rates and tax breaks, set at 5.5% (until 2006). Initially, France placed educated Beninese and 90 French civil servants to manage Niger's bureaucracy, with the European group advising Diori in the capital dubbed the "Corsican Mafia" (Kor-Shee-Shun”). This led many Nigeriens to view Diori as a neo-colonial puppet.
With French assistance, Niger developed hospitals and sanitary systems, primarily in urban areas, leading to a decline in infant mortality rates from a peak 160 deaths per 1000 births in 1960. However, Niger rural investment was relatively lacking, which was the majority of the country. Basic healthcare & sanitary systems + agrarian society = population boom that still continues today. In 1963, Diori replaced Beninese civil servants with Songhai Nigerien ones but retained French European civil servants and advisors.
Perceived Corruption: Diori's administration faced allegations of corruption. There were two main forms of corruption: corruption affecting basic state capacity and using political power for mass enrichment.
Lack of state capacity: Diori proposed a hydroelectric dam near Niamey to address Niger's electricity shortage and provide irrigation. However, the project stalled during his reign due to financing challenges and corruption.
Mass enrichment: The Diori family owned extensive prime agricultural land, villas, and luxury properties in the capital and rented to foreign entities and French businessmen at high rates. This led to widespread questioning of their wealth, with critics likening Hamani’s wife, Aissa Diori to Marie Antoinette (the French royal who is attributed to saying “let them eat cake” in Pre-Revolutionary 18th Century France) amid the 1970s Nigerien famine.
Economic Policy: Diori’s plan was basically “sell peanuts, beef, and pick cotton” until France firms find uranium, oil, and gas”. Most of the minerals weren’t really extracted until very late in the Diori regime or decades later.
Hydrocarbons: American firms like Texaco and French firms like Elf Aquitaine (now part of TotalEnergies) discovered oil & gas in the 1970s. Niger has recoverable reserves of 24 billion cubic meters of natural gas. This is relatively really small. Normally in natural gas we talk trillions. Oman has 24 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Equatorial Guinea has over 1 trillion. France itself has 590 billion cubic feet of natural gas. As for Nigerien oil, the oil development was stalled. It wouldn’t really kickoff until the 2000s.
Uranium: Diori bet his existence on uranium mining, thinking he make Niger as rich as Saudi Arabia with uranium (little did he know that uranium was going to be a paltry fraction of the oil market. Go back to part one to see how small the uranium market ended up being compared to oil). Commercial Uranium mining in Niger didn’t start until 1971.
French President Charles De Gaulle wanted to minimize tax obligations while Diori wanted taxes on French Orano/Areva to be as high as possible. De Gaulle had the edge in the end. Why did France have leverage over Niger? Because Niger was not the only country with uranium. France also retrieved uranium from Canada, United States, Apartheid South Africa, Australia, Congo, Gabon and Mali in the late 60s, early 70s as well.
Each time, a uranium pit was open for commercial exploitation, Diori’s government would set up a state owned enterprise that would be a joint venture with the French state owned firm Areva (now Orano). The Nigerien government would take a minority stake (20% to 37%) while France provides the managerial staff, capital, and know-how. For the first mine in Airlit, Niger had basically no money, so Diori had to borrow from France to gain that equity stake. Orano would employ Nigerien miners (who worked in deplorable conditions), while the managerial and technical positions would be run by the French. Gradually, as Nigeriens became more educated, you started to see more Nigeriens in managerial roles, but that took time and the process is still occurring. To see the ownership of each uranium mine that the Nigerien government has, click on part one here.
As Niger exploited new uranium mines in the early 1970s, Japan’s state owned Overseas Uranium Resources Development Company(OURD) would also invest with France. (But in 2021, Japan’s OURD sold its equity stake to French Orano and Spanish Enusa.)
Oil Crisis: In 1973, was the first oil shock. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries exerted power to reduce oil production, increasing international oil prices after the Yom Kippur War. This pained Niger, which already had a massive current account deficit, with higher oil imports.
Attempted Uranium Cartel: The high oil prices made France double down on uranium, and Diori wanted to renegotiate uranium prices. That same year, Diori wanted to create a uranium cartel. Diori spoke to President Bongo of Gabon so that Gabon and Niger can set uranium prices together to extract more uranium revenue from France. France tried to delay talks with Niger & Gabon, using French President’s Pompidou’s ill health as an excuse.
Agriculture failure: Niger faced a severe multi-year drought in the early 1970s, exacerbated by Diori's lack of investment and delays in large-scale irrigation projects (i.e. Gaddafi’s Great man made river). This led to a famine in Niger in 1974, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread malnutrition, particularly affecting the Tuareg-Berbers who lost significant cattle herds. International aid efforts were launched and hundreds of thousands of Nigeriens escaped to seek refuge in Nigeria and Mali. Agricultural export tax revenue from cotton, cattle, and peanuts (Niger’s main exports and the life and blood of the Nigerien economy at the time) declined by 40% due to the drought.
When food aid was coming in, Diori’s government officials who were responsible for distributing aid were accused of selling aid at inflated prices to outside buyers instead of feeding the starving families.
The deadly famine, the blatant corruption, the lack of representation of other ethnic tribes, the cozying up to France, and the failure to take care of the miner’s working conditions all led to a coup. To many Nigeriens, even one of these was worthy of overthrow, but to hit a bingo board of five was just outrageous. He was overthrown in 1974 by the military. This ended Diori’s quest for a uranium cartel with Gabon. France was supposed to protect Diori from coups like they did with Leon M’ba in Gabon. But since Diori had decent relations with Muammar Gaddafi and wanted to make a uranium cartel with Gabon, keeping Diori wasn’t benefitting the interests of France. Some people argue France funded the coup, some people argue France didn’t. At least not this one. Diori was neither the ardent nationalist, competent autocrat, nor a faithful French puppet, just an incompetent founding father who neglected agriculture for failed resource nationalism in an agrarian country.
Seyni Kountche “Say-nee Koont-Shay” (1974-1987)
Seyni was a military strongman who pledged to end corruption and make swift reforms. He started by changing the constitution and banning parliament and political parties.
Ending Corruption: Kountche tried to “clean house” by imprisoning or killing corrupt government leaders. For example in 1980, Kountche imprisoned former civilian secretary general, Boubakar Adamu for siphoning government funds by double invoicing government purchases with aid of a French businessman.
For anyone curious about how this form of corruption worked in the previous Diori regime, I’ll give an example.
1. The government official and the French businessmen agree on a deal for goods or services at a certain price. ($20M for a new villa for government workers).
2. The businessman creates two invoices: one for the actual price ($20M) of the construction of the villa and another invoice at a higher, inflated price ($35M) .
3. The government official approves the purchase based on the inflated price, and the government pays the higher amount ($35M)
4. The businessman pockets the difference between the two invoices ($35M - $20M = $15M), and shares the profits with the government official as a kickback. Let’s say the kickback rate is 10%. That means the government official pockets $1.5M and the businessman pockets $13.5M.
After catching the government official, Kountche ordered a 2 month audit of all government services. Unfortunately, Kountche ended up being corrupt and nepotistic in his rule as well. He also resumed the Zarma-Songhai ethnic supremacy in the country, isolating most people.
Uranium boom: Kountche did not continue to pursue a uranium cartel with Bongo of Gabon like his predecessor. Instead, he renegotiated previous uranium mining contracts with France. The new contract allowed Niger to sell uranium to other players besides France and countries that France allowed.
Increased uranium production from the joint venture mines owned by Niger and France benefitted Niger. France’s increased demand for uranium as a replacement for oil during the oil crisis, boosted Niger’s government revenue significantly. Uranium had a price boom from $4 per pound to $20 per pound. During the time of Diori in 1971, uranium inflows to the state budget were 11B CFA Franc ($36M dollars at exchange rates at that time). By 1982, uranium inflows were $94B CFA Franc ($314M dollars).
Selling Uranium became 75% of the Nigerien government revenue. The uranium boom was so valuable, that Senyi lowered export taxes on peanut farmers, tripled the pay for civil servants, and built schools, roads, clinics, and wells.
Niger started to undertake expensive state-led manufacturing undertakings, thinking that the high uranium prices were permanent. The Uranium boom was helping the country until uranium prices crashed in 1980.
Why did uranium crash? Three reasons:
1. A year earlier in 1979, was the three mile island incident in America. The result led to a global decline in confidence in nuclear energy and demand sharply dropped globally, leading to a price slump.
2. Secondly, nuclear fuel is recyclable, after buying so much uranium from Gabon and Niger, France and other countries’ demand for new uranium decreases as countries can now recycle nuclear fuel instead of buying new uranium.
3. Other major uranium producers at the time - America, Canada, Australia and Apartheid South Africa (which owned Namibia at the time) - increased uranium production. More supply means lower prices.
Mines were closing down in Niger. Export sales were so low that, mining the ore was profit losing. Niger’s government revenue from uranium was cut in half and export earnings dropped.
The price of uranium wouldn’t recover and mines wouldn’t reopen to full production again until the early 2000s. Niger could no longer subsidize the manufacturing state owned enterprises in cement, textiles, and etc. and the country was approaching bankruptcy. For 20 years, Niger was suffering and had to reschedule its debt payments. Look at chart below to see the rise and fall of uranium prices.
After the uranium price collapse, from 1983 to 1991, Niger continually borrowed from the IMF, requesting a new loan each year. The international uranium price bust destroyed the economy. Uranium towns like Arlit, dried up, leaving many Tuaregs unemployed, contributing to the future Tuareg rebellion.
Typically, when commodity prices drop, holders stockpile to raise spot prices. Botswana and De Beers did this with diamonds to keep prices high. However, Niger couldn’t afford to do this it needed to sell any uranium it still could for foreign exchange. Niger needed foreign exchange to buy food since Nigeriens do not make enough food to feed themselves.
Since Niger was suffering from a uranium price collapse, Kountche negotiated with France for a “minimum price guarantee for uranium”. The premium wasn’t big but it provided a small cushion to Niger.
Failure to invest in agriculture & irrigation:
Senyi: “as long as their is good rainfall in Niger, we are not going to ask for food.” (Depending on rainfall??? My goodness…Nothing is worse than an inept autocrat)
The impact of population growth and lack of irrigation was so damaging that Niger had issues with soil erosion, degradation, and deforestation. As a result, Senyi depended on America for food aid.
Suspicious of Tuareg Berbers & Gaddafi: Kountche teamed up with Mitterrand of France, after seeing Gaddafi’s military intervention with Chad, Niger’s neighbor. Kountche was suspicious of Gaddafi since noticed that Nigerien Tuaregs were going to Gaddafi’s training camps. He accused Gaddafi of trying to destabilize his government as there were three attempts to overthrow his regime.
As Gaddafi was trying to annex Chad, Senyi allowed France to use Niger’s military airfield at Darkou to parachute arms and supplies to the Western backed, Hissane Habre of Chad, to push out Gaddafi. As French President Francois Mitterrand said, Senyi was ''one of the most loyal friends of France.''
Immigration Crisis: In 1983, Nigeria expelled African immigrants from the country. Over 100K Nigeriens were kicked out of Nigeria. Also, in 1986, Algeria kicked out 2K Nigeriens in their country. It was difficult for Niger to take in these populations. After all, Niger can’t feed herself.
In 1987, Seyni dies in office from a brain tumor.
Ali Saibou (1987-1993)
Ali Saibou, Seyni’s army chief of staff and cousin, assumed power.
Resource Crash Continues: Unfortunately uranium prices kept getting lower, and after the USSR died, newly uranium-rich countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan entered international uranium markets for the first time. The flood of supply of uranium crushed uranium prices further. In the 90s, Niger was exporting more cigarettes than uranium due to globally low uranium price.
IMF Reform: In the 1990s, IMF and World Bank conditioned for emergency loans for not just austerity measures but also multiparty democratic elections, prompting Saibou and many other African countries to permit opposition parties in the 1990s. However, IMF-mandated austerity measures led to cuts in civil servant salaries, security budgets, public services equipment, and university scholarships. These cuts sparked unrest, resulting in a violent crackdown on protesting university students in which 10 people died. The government spending cuts to the Tuareg regions also contributed to the Tuareg War.
Note: The Tuareg are nomadic minorities that are basically the in between of Sub-Saharan Africans and tawny North Africans. Look at the picture below to see what I mean:
Many Tuaregs are black as well. Overall, Tuaregs saw themselves as stateless people, oppressed people who have been robbed of a state by external influences (similar to how Kurds, Palestinians, and many other groups see themselves). Oppression isn’t always “lighter people oppressing darker people”, Niger was an example of darker people oppressing lighter people.
The Tuareg War: In 1990, the Tuareg Arab-Berbers and the Tubu started a rebellion, claiming the government was neglecting them, especially since… they were dying of famine in their area. The Tuareg had a point, the Agadez region was the home of the Tuareg Sultanate, but during the Uranium boom from 1973-1981, many Songhai and Hausas moved there for work, creating more “Black Towns”. The Tuareg also felt that the uranium wasn’t being allocated to them, which is true. Most of the government spending and hospitals went into the Songhai areas. The Tuareg felt that the mining firms benefited Songhai first, and Tuareg last. Lastly, Tuareg indigenous rights were not being respected.
The Tuareg, feeling excluded from the benefits of mining and lacking representation in government, sought autonomy/independence from Niger and Mali. Many Tuaregs joined Muammar Gaddafi's revolutionary camps, exacerbating tensions. Saibou's regime focused on quelling the Tuareg rebellion.
By 1993, due to the war, in Niger’s 1st multiparty elections since independence, Saibou lost.
Mahamane Ousmane (1993-1996)
Mahamane was Niger’s first democratically elected President in Niger, and there was significant praise from the West due to a transition to democracy. There was so much hope that he would bring the nation out of the brink, especially since he was a mathematician and engineer. Unfortunately, his rule failed to meet the hype.
Corruption: There was so much corruption in this administration. As always, the administration Ousmane favorited the Zarma-Songhai, annoying the many other tribes. Also, government audit showed that 40% of the millions Niger spent on government contracts was “lost”. Also, there were government workers who haven’t been paid in months.
CFA Franc devaluation in 1994: The International Monetary Fund advised France to devalue the CFA franc by 50%, causing riots across French Africa, including Niger. You might be asking why did the IMF ask France do this?
I wrote about this before in my Gabon and Chad article. But the point was that a weak currency could help Nigerien firms compete with other markets by undercutting competition with cheap prices. But the downsides were just too painful. Weak currencies also mean imports (food, fuel and medicine) are more expensive. The devaluation, just made the Tuareg Berbers riot more.
Continued fight Tuareg Berbers: The ongoing scuffle with the Tuareg Berbers escalated as they splintered into various factions. But by 1995, with the help of France and Algeria, Mahamane was able to break a cease-fire with the Tuareg Berbers. After the war, the Nigerien government promised to invest more in Tuareg areas.
More borrowing: The currency devaluation, the uranium price collapse, and the Tuareg Berber rebellion made Niger starved for cash. In 1994 and 1996, Niger returned borrowing from the IMF.
Late in Ousmane’s administration, there was a factionalist issue between Prime Minister Hama Amadou and President Ousmane about the path to pursue IMF austerity measures.
Coup #2: In 1996, military leader (and first Hausa Nigerien head of state) Ibrahim Bare Mainassara (My-Nah-Sah-Rah) overthrew the government and ran a military regime.
Conclusion
We have gone through over half of Niger’s post colonial history and it is quite lackluster. Inflation adjusted, Nigeriens are 70% poorer in the year 1996 than they were in 1960.
Will Niger improve? Click here for Niger, part three!
Given the idealogical, cultured, political and religious diversity of Africa why do so many of them ignore agriculture. Even given resource exporters like Indonesia and a basketcase like Pakistan managed to make the bare minimum progress in cereal yields per hectare.
So much information here. I’ll go through it again, there’s a lot to digest. There are so many parallels to each of the countries you discuss.